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THE RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERSHIP 
ORDINANCE AND NOVEL TEXTUAL 






Although gun ownership is a fundamental right under the Second 
Amendment of the Constitution,
1
 it is subject to reasonable restrictions.
2
  
The City of Chicago’s most recent attempt to define the contours of those 
restrictions raises serious textual questions about the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  This Comment will evaluate various provisions of 
Chicago’s new firearm ordinance and conclude (1) that it is likely 
unconstitutional and (2) that future gun-control regulations will only be 
upheld if they respect the full understanding of the contours of the Second 
Amendment adopted in Heller, rather than merely satisfying its narrow 
holding. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller
3
 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,
4
 the City of Chicago promptly amended the Responsible Gun 
Ownership Ordinance (the Ordinance) to further its interest in protecting the 
public welfare and safety.
5
  The Ordinance immediately generated federal 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012. 
1 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010). 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (listing reasonable 
restrictions, such as “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms”). 
3 554 U.S. 570.  
4 130 S. Ct. 3020. 
5 Chi., Ill., Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance (July 2, 2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE (2010)). 
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lawsuits alleging that several provisions violate fundamental rights under 
the Second Amendment.
6
  The Second Amendment provides: 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
7
 
The Chicago Ordinance is particularly worthy of evaluation for three 
reasons.  First, now that the Second Amendment has been incorporated 
against the states,
8
 these suits are the first in the wave of gun-control 
litigation that has been predicted since Heller was decided.
9
  Second, the 
new Ordinance replaced the provisions struck down in McDonald, 
rendering it particularly relevant for evaluating the implications of that 
decision.
10
  And third, the Ordinance—as originally amended
11
—contained 
several provisions that implicate previously unexamined limits to the text of 
the Second Amendment. 
Until recently, scholarship has focused on whether the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms and whether that 
right is incorporated against the states.
12
  As those questions have now been 
resolved in favor of an individual right and incorporation, states are left 
scrambling to define the line between a legitimate exercise of their police 
power and infringement on the fundamental rights of their citizens.  The 
new Ordinance is a highly visible example of this kind of legislation.  A 
textual analysis
13
 of the rights protected by the Second Amendment in this 
context may be beneficial in providing guidance to other states as they seek 
an understanding of the appropriate reach of the police power. 
 
6 See Complaint, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10–3525); 
Benson v. City of Chicago, No. 1:10-cv-04184, 2010 WL 2796263 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 6, 2010). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
8 See generally McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020.  
9 Linda Greenhouse, D.C. Ban Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, at A1.  
10 See Chi., Ill., Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance (stating that the Ordinance was 
amended in light of McDonald and Heller).  
11 In response to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Ezell, which affirmed the grant of a 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of provisions forbidding firing ranges within 
the city limits, Ezell, 651 F.3d at 711, the City of Chicago amended CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE 
§ 8-20-280 to allow for firearm training within the city.  Coun. J. 7-6-11, p. 3073, § 4 
(repealing § 8-20-280, which prohibited shooting galleries and target ranges).  However, 
since this Comment aims to help other legislatures understand the scope of the Second 
Amendment after Heller, it will address the statute as it was initially enacted and explain 
why such provisions were contrary to the Amendment’s purpose. 
12 See, e.g., CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE (1994); 
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED (Indep. Inst., 2d ed. 1994) (1984).  
13 Legislatures will most benefit from a textual analysis because this is the analysis used 
by the Supreme Court.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (insisting that “the scope of the 
Second Amendment right” is determined by textual and historical inquiry, not by interest-
balancing). 
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In Heller, the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the meaning of 
the Second Amendment and answered a number of the preliminary 
questions needed to evaluate these provisions.
14
  However, many questions 
remain unanswered.  Part II of this Comment will summarize the Heller 
decision, highlighting the conclusions reached and emphasizing the 
questions that remain unanswered.  It will also briefly recap McDonald, 
which incorporated the Second Amendment against the states, and highlight 
the points the Court found particularly important in both decisions.  Part III 
will attempt to use the original understanding of the text of the Second 
Amendment to answer key questions left open by Heller.  It will then apply 
those answers to the new Ordinance to evaluate how the provisions will fare 
under constitutional scrutiny.  Finally, Part IV will put the analysis in a 
broader context, focusing on the implications for legislatures attempting to 
regulate firearms after Heller and McDonald and identifying which 
concerns must be respected as central to effective exercise of the Second 
Amendment right. 
This Comment will conclude that the recently enacted Responsible 
Gun Ownership Ordinance is likely unconstitutional, as it fails to respect 
the activities protected by the Second Amendment and intrudes upon 
concerns that were central to the Amendment’s adoption. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
In Heller, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the meaning of the 
Second Amendment
15
 and determined that it “guarantee[s] the individual 
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”
16
  This 
conclusion resolved the longstanding debate over whether the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right, or whether “the right of the 
people” was premised upon membership in a militia.
17
 
The determination that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right and the reasoning in support of that conclusion have significant 
implications for the meaning of the provisions within the Second 
Amendment.  These provisions, in turn, are essential to understanding the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s protection and evaluating the 
constitutionality of the Chicago Ordinance and future attempts by 
legislators to restrict the right to keep and bear arms.  As such, it is 
 
14 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–603 (2008). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 592 (emphasis added). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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important to understand precisely what the Supreme Court determined in 
Heller, precisely which questions the Court answered, and precisely which 
questions were not addressed. 
1. The Right of the People 
The Court in Heller determined that the phrase, “the right of the 
people,” unambiguously referred to an “individual right[], not ‘collective’ 
rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some 
corporate body.”
18
  This determination was made through reference to other 




This understanding has significant implications for the meaning of the 
rest of the Amendment, particularly the Militia Clause.  Since the “militia” 
consisted of “a subset of ‘the people’—those who were male, able bodied, 
and within a certain age range,”
20
 membership in the militia was an inherent 
characteristic, not an organizational construct.  This means the 
Amendment’s scope reaches beyond the militia context to “all members of 
the political community.”
21
  The majority’s understanding of the Second 
Amendment as protecting an individual right is the key difference 
underlying its disagreement with the dissent in Heller, and can be seen 
throughout the Court’s interpretation of each provision. 
2. To Keep and Bear Arms 
The Court then addressed the substance of the protected right “to keep 
and bear Arms.”  Eschewing the dissent’s suggestion that “to keep and bear 
Arms” was a term of art,
22
 the majority opinion addressed the phrase as two 
separate actions: to keep arms and to bear arms.  Before addressing the 
verbs, however, the Court addressed their object: “Arms.”
23
 
i. The Meaning of “Arms” 
The Court in Heller determined that the meaning of the term “Arms” 
has not changed since 1791, and “extends . . . to all instruments that 
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of 
 
18 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
19 Id. at 578–80 (“Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the 
people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”). 
20 Id. at 580. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 591 (noting that “[s]tate constitutions of the founding period routinely grouped 
multiple (related) guarantees under a singular ‘right’”). 
23 Id. at 581. 
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the founding.”
24
  The term is not limited to arms used in a military 
context,
25
 but extends to “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or 
takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.”
26
 
As used in the Second Amendment, however, the term “Arms” is not 
given the maximum scope suggested by its dictionary definition as “any 
thing that a man . . . useth . . . to cast at or strike another.”
27
  Rather, the 
term “Arms” has been understood to encompass weapons in the common 
usage.
28
  This common-usage understanding includes handguns but 
excludes “dangerous and unusual weapons,” such as M-16 rifles.
29
  The 
Court noted that this restriction on the term “Arms” creates tension with the 
concept of a militia capable of effective resistance to tyrannical oppression, 
particularly given the capabilities of modern militaries.
30
  Despite this 
tension between the Amendment’s purpose and its practical application, the 
Court deferred to the limitation on the meaning of “Arms” adopted in 
United States v. Miller,
31
 which the Court interpreted as holding that “the 
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed 
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”
32
 
While Heller established the form of “Arms” referenced in the Second 
Amendment, it did not answer the question of whether “Arms,” as applied 
to an individual, refers to the possession of a single weapon for use in his 
defense, or multiple weapons, as the plural form of the term “Arms” might 
suggest.
33
  This question will be addressed in Part III.A. 
ii. To Keep Arms 
After establishing the meaning of “Arms” and its restriction within the 
Second Amendment, the Court in Heller then evaluated what it means to 
 
24 Id. at 582. 
25 Id. at 581 (stating that “[s]ervants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on 
Sundays, &c. and not bear other arms” to demonstrate that “arms” refers to “weapons that 
were not specifically designed for military use” (citing 1 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND 
COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 187 (2d ed. 1771))).  
26 Id. (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 Id. (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Id. at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’” 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939))). 
29 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 Id. 
31 307 U.S. 174. 
32 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
33 Compare id. at 581 (“any thing that a man wears for his defence” (emphasis added) 
(quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187)), with id. (“[w]eapons of offence” (alteration 
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 106 (4th ed., reprt. 1978) (1773))). 
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keep arms.  “[T]he most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second 
Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’”
34
  As the meaning of “Arms” was not 
limited to those weapons used for military service, the right to “keep Arms” 
was likewise unconnected to an organized fighting force.  Rather, “‘[k]eep 
arms’ was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for 
militiamen and everyone else.”
35
  This is consistent with the Court’s 
understanding of the “right of the people” as enshrining an individual right, 




The question that remains unanswered, however, is whether this right 
to keep arms for one’s personal defense allows restrictions on the condition 
in which the arms may be kept.  Heller established that the District of 
Columbia’s requirement “that firearms in the home be rendered and kept 
inoperable at all times . . . makes it impossible for citizens to use them for 
the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.”
37
  
The question raised by the Chicago Ordinance—which allows only one 
operable firearm in the home at a time—is whether it can require that all 
other firearms in a home be rendered inoperable if a single firearm is kept 
unlocked and ready for use.
38
 
iii. To Bear Arms 
Continuing with the substance of the Second Amendment, the Court 
determined that the term “to bear” carried the same meaning at the time of 
the Amendment’s adoption that it does today: “to carry.”
39
  When used in 
conjunction with “Arms,” however, the term has a more specific meaning: 
carrying arms for the purpose of confrontation.
40
  As with the term “keep 
Arms,” the right to “bear Arms” was not limited to a military context, but 
referred to the individual right to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person 
or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and 
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another 
person.”
41
  This definition sharply contrasted with the understanding 
 
34 Id. at 582. 
35 Id. at 583 (citations omitted). 
36 Id. at 583 n.7 (citing historical examples of the right to keep arms for individual 
defense). 
37 Id. at 630. 
38 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (2011) (allowing only one operable firearm in the 
home). 
39 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)); see also id. 
(stating that “‘bear arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons 
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adopted by the dissent, which gave “bear Arms” an idiomatic meaning: “to 
serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.”
42
  However, the Court rejected 
this definition, noting that “if ‘bear arms’ means . . . the carrying of arms 
only for military purposes, one simply cannot add ‘for the purpose of killing 
game’” to the end of the phrase,
43




iv. The Full Meaning of “to Keep and Bear Arms” 
Putting the individual pieces of the clause “to keep and bear Arms” 
together, the Court determined that it “guarantee[s] the individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”
45
  It further noted that 
this individual right predates the Constitution and is not dependent upon the 
Bill of Rights or the federal government for its existence.
46
  The Court 
explicitly rejected any connection between the right and public service, as 
“it was secured to [the people] as individuals, according to ‘libertarian 
political principles,’ not as members of a fighting force.”
47
 
The phrase “to keep and bear Arms” was not a term of art limiting that 
right to military service.
48
  Instead, the core of the right to keep arms and 
the right to bear arms was the fundamental right to self-defense, as 
“Americans understood the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a 
citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his 
behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’”
49
 
Having established “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation,” and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation 
 
outside of an organized militia”); id. at 587 n.10 (citing historical usages of “bear Arms” 
outside of the militia context). 
42 Id. at 586 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 Id. at 589. 
44 Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Barron, et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 24, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (“We 
have reviewed the ‘bear arms’ language in the texts identified by Professor Cornell and 
concluded that in four of the five instances of non-military use, the use was expressly 
qualified by further language indicating a different meaning (e.g., ‘bear arms in times of 
peace’ or ‘bear arms . . . for the purpose of killing game’).”). 
45 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
46 Id. (“[T]he Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-
existing right [and as] ‘[this] is not a right granted by the Constitution[,] [n]either is it in any 
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.’” (quoting United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876))). 
47 Id. at 593 (citations omitted) (noting also that the right “was clearly an individual right, 
having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia”). 
48 Id. at 591 (“State constitutions of the founding period routinely grouped multiple 
(related) guarantees under a singular ‘right.’”). 
49 Id. at 595 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *145 n.42). 
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and defence” as the core of the Second Amendment, the Court in Heller 
then addressed the Prefatory Clause, “a well regulated Militia,” to ensure 
that its interpretation of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” did 
not create a conflict within the Amendment.
50
 
3. A Well Regulated Militia, Being Necessary to the Security of a Free State 
A Prefatory Clause announces and clarifies the purpose of the 
operative portion of the Amendment, but does not expand or limit its 
scope.
51
  The meaning of the prefatory phrase, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State,” then, does not describe a 
limitation on the right to bear arms; rather, it clarifies the purpose of the 
right to bear arms.  Therefore, understanding the meaning of the prefatory 
clause—and through it, the purpose of the Second Amendment—is 
essential to legislators who wish to craft limits on this fundamental right 
without running afoul of the Constitution.  
Citing Miller,
52
 the Supreme Court in Heller determined that “the 
Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the 
common defense.”
53
  This broad meaning of the militia describes an entity 
that predates the Constitution and exists independent from congressional 
action.
54
  “Congress is given the power . . . not to create, but to ‘organiz[e]’ 
[the militia]—and not to organize ‘a’ militia . . . but to organize ‘the’ 
militia, connoting a body already in existence.”
55
  The militia was not, as 
the petitioners suggested, limited to government-regulated military forces.
56
  
As the Court stated, “[a]lthough we agree . . . that ‘militia’ means the same 
thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners 
identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia.”
57
  The fact that 
Congress may create an army or navy
58
 from members of the militia, or call 
forth and organize the militia, does not diminish or alter the composition of 
the militia itself.
59
  As the Court stated, “[a]lthough the militia consists of 
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 577–78. 
52 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
53 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
54 See id. at 596. 
55 Id. (first alteration in original). 
56 Id. (“Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that ‘[m]ilitias 
are the state- and congressionally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses 
(art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16).’” (citations omitted)). 
57 Id..  
58 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13). 
59 See id. 
2012] THE “RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERSHIP” ORDINANCE 479 




Thus, the modifier “well regulated” does not indicate that this militia is 
one controlled by the federal or state government.  Instead, “‘well-
regulated’ implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline 
and training,”
61
 which would be necessary for any group attempting to 
secure a free state. 
“The phrase ‘security of a free state’ meant ‘security of a free polity,’ 
not security of each of the several States . . . .”
62
  While there are many 
reasons that a well-regulated militia was “necessary to the security of a free 
State,” Heller enumerated three in particular.  First, the militia was useful in 
“repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections.”
63
  Second, it 
“render[ed] large standing armies unnecessary,”
64
 which was a major 
concern of the founding generation.
65
  Finally, and perhaps most important 
to understanding the scope of the Second Amendment, “when the able-
bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better 
able to resist tyranny.”
66
 
In describing the rationale for a well-regulated militia, the Court 
placed particular emphasis on the ability of the militia to resist the power of 
a potentially tyrannical central government.
67
  The founders understood the 
history of the English right to bear arms and knew that the “way tyrants had 
eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by 
banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a 
select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents.”
68
  Among 
the generation that overthrew British rule through the use of its citizen 
militia, “[i]t was understood across the political spectrum that the right 
helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to 




Viewed in light of the experiences of the founding generation: 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 597. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 597–98. 
65 Id. at 598 (“During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal government 
would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia 
was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.”). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 598–99. 
68 Id. at 598. 
69 Id. at 599. 
480 OWEN MCGOVERN [Vol. 102 
It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause 
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the 
militia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only 
reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more 
important for self-defense and hunting.  But the threat that the new Federal 
Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the 




To reaffirm the individual nature of this right over the militia-oriented 
understanding, the Court applied the militia understanding to this particular 
set of concerns.  It concluded that if the Second Amendment guaranteed 
only “the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized 
militia . . . if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional 
beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the 
existence of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a safeguard against tyranny.”
71
  This 
interpretation “guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found 




Therefore, Heller’s analysis of the Prefatory Clause is consistent with 
the individual rights framework it applies to the rest of the Amendment.  
Further, since the Prefatory Clause announces the purpose of the 
Amendment, it demonstrates that, at the very least, the right to keep and 
bear arms is expressly guaranteed for the purpose of maintaining a well-
regulated citizens’ militia.
73
  The question left unanswered, however, is the 
degree of regulation that can be imposed upon this right without interfering 
with the ability of the militia to remain “well regulated.” 
4. The Holding in Heller, Questions Answered, and Questions Left 
Undecided 
Despite the Constitution’s command that this right “shall not be 
infringed,” the right to keep and bear arms is not unlimited.
74
  It is “not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose.”
75
  While the holding in Heller did not clearly 
delineate the precise limitations to be placed upon the exercise of this 
fundamental right, it did provide some examples of the type of regulation 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 600 (citations omitted). 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 577 (explaining that the Prefatory Clause “announces a purpose” of the 
Amendment, but “does not limit the [Amendment] grammatically”). 
74 Id. at 595 (“Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right 
of free speech was not . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
75 Id. at 626. 
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that would be acceptable, such as prohibitions on concealed carry.  The 
Court noted that the “majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the 
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful 
under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”
76
  It further stated that its 
decision would not disturb prohibitions on “the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
77
 
More informative than what the Court did not strike down, however, 
are the characteristics of the D.C. statute that rendered it unconstitutional: 
the law “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home . . . [and] also 
require[d] that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by 
a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.”
78
 
In evaluating these provisions, the Court noted that, even beyond the 
need for a well-regulated militia, “the inherent right of self-defense has 
been central to the Second Amendment right.”
79
  Even though the right is 
not unlimited, the D.C. law could not stand, as it “amount[ed] to a 
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ [handguns] that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for that lawful purpose [self-defense in the 
home].”
80
  This prohibition of an entire class of firearms was found 
particularly objectionable in this case, as it even extended “to the home, 
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”
81
  
The Court concluded that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we 
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home 
‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of 
one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”
82
  The Court 
also found unconstitutional the requirement that any lawful firearms in the 
home be rendered inoperable, as it “makes it impossible for citizens to use 
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.”
83
 
Despite striking down the D.C. statute as an unconstitutional violation 
of a fundamental right, the Court did not establish the standard of review to 
be applied going forward.  However, it did explicitly reject rational basis 
 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 626–27. 




82 Id. at 628–29 (citations omitted). 
83 Id. at 630. 
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review
84
 and the interest-balancing test suggested in Justice Breyer’s 
dissent.
85
  In rejecting the interest-balancing approach, the Court noted that 
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood 
to have when the people adopted them . . . [and are] the very product of an 
interest balancing by the people.”
86
  The discussion of standard of review 
concluded with the Court stating that “whatever else it leaves to future 
evaluation, [the Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”
87
 
B. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO 
McDonald v. City of Chicago
88
 dealt with incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the meaning of the text, and therefore 
added little to the understanding of the meaning of the Second Amendment.  
However, it is important to highlight briefly two key elements of the case.  
First, McDonald determined that the Second Amendment articulated a 
fundamental right, and therefore must be applied uniformly to the federal 
government and the states.
89
  In discussing the fundamental nature of this 
right, the Court emphasized that “[i]t cannot be doubted that the right to 
bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that 




Like Heller, McDonald acknowledged that the Second Amendment 
was codified, in part, because of the fear of a centralized government’s 
ability to impose rule over a disarmed populace.
91
  It further emphasized, as 





84 Id. at 628 n.27 (“Obviously, [rational basis review] could not be used to evaluate the 
extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . .”). 
85 Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny 
to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests 
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety 
concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly 
burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.  I would simply adopt such an 
interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.”).  
86 Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion). 
87 Id. at 635. 
88 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
89 Id. at 3050. 
90 Id. at 3043–44. 
91 Id. at 3037. 
92 Id. at 3048 (citations omitted). 
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McDonald is important to consider because it struck down the 
predecessor of the new Chicago Ordinance, which the Court determined 
was similar to the law struck down in Heller.
93
  The law stated that “‘[n]o 
person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such person is the holder of 
a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’”
94
  The law then 
“prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning 
handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”
95
  
The similarity between the laws struck down in Heller and McDonald is 
important because the new Chicago Ordinance is the first legislative 
response to a state law that has been struck down under the Second 
Amendment. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Following Heller and McDonald, the City of Chicago amended its 
code to comply with the rules laid out in those decisions.  However, the 
new Ordinance reads those opinions narrowly, restricting their meaning to 
protect the exact question addressed: possession of firearms in the home.
96
  
In doing so, the City of Chicago ignored the broader implications of Heller 
and McDonald, which extend beyond the right of an individual to use 
firearms for self-defense.
97
  By narrowly interpreting the meaning of the 
Second Amendment, the City of Chicago’s newly approved Ordinance 
continues to impermissibly restrict this fundamental right. 
Applying the understanding of the Second Amendment established in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, this Comment evaluates the new Chicago 
Ordinance to determine which if any provisions remain in violation of the 
Second Amendment.  It will begin by focusing on the text of the Second 
Amendment and two issues not addressed by the Heller decision.  First, it 
will address the meaning of the term “Arms”—focusing on whether use of 
the plural form indicates more than one weapon and the term’s relation to 
“the people”—and its implications for the Ordinance, which allows only 
one operable firearm in the home.  The Comment will then turn to the 
meaning of “to bear Arms”—focusing on what qualifies as bearing arms—
 
93 Id. at 3026. 
94 Id. (alteration in original) (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009)). 
95 Id. (citing .CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-050(c) (2009)). 
96 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (providing that it shall be “unlawful for any 
person to carry or possess a handgun, except when in the person’s home”). 
97 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Americans understood 
the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the 
intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’” (quoting 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *145 n.42)). 
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and its implications for provisions of the Ordinance that prohibit carrying 
firearms outside the home. 
The Comment will then consider the purpose of “a well regulated 
Militia” as understood by the Court in Heller and evaluate the likely effect 
of that clause on provisions banning: (i) shooting galleries within the City 
of Chicago; (ii) discharging a firearm in the city except in self-defense; and 
(iii) carrying firearms outside the home. 
A. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE MEANING OF THE TERM 
“ARMS” 
The Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
98
  In United States v. Heller, 
the Supreme Court evaluated the meaning of this provision and determined 
that it “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in 
case of confrontation.”
99
  In finding the D.C. statute unconstitutional, the 
Court placed particular emphasis on the importance of self-defense within 
one’s home.
100
  After McDonald v. City of Chicago struck down Chicago’s 
handgun law as unconstitutional, the city looked to the Heller decision for 
guidance on how to redraft the ordinance.
101
  The Heller Court stated that 
“the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy 
choices off the table.  These include the absolute prohibition of handguns 
held and used for self-defense in the home.”
102
  Reading the mandate in 
Heller narrowly, Chicago amended its firearm law, making it a crime to 




This provision does not appear to violate the literal holding in Heller, 
that a city cannot create an absolute prohibition against having or using a 
gun for self-defense in the home.  But it remains unclear whether the term 
“Arms” indicates multiple weapons, as its pluralized form seems to 
indicate, or whether “Arms” is a term of art meaning any single weapon.  
The constitutionality of this prohibition turns on the answer to this question. 
 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
99 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
100 Id. at 635 (“And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.”). 
101
 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (explicitly stating that amendments to the handgun 
statute were made in response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald). 
102 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
103 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (“[E]very person who keeps or possesses a firearm 
in his home shall keep no more than one firearm in his home assembled and operable.”). 
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1. Support for a Singular Reading of “Arms” 
One definition of “Arms” provided in Heller is “any thing that a man 
wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or 
strike another.”
104
  This definition, on its face, seems to suggest that “Arms” 
can be read in the singular, as it refers to any “thing,” not “things.”  Further, 
“all firearms constituted ‘arms.’”
105
  This reading may support the singular 
view, for if all firearms constitute arms, then any firearm, as an individual 
thing, would constitute arms on its own. 
Legislation enacted in the period before and after the Revolution 
provides further support for the proposition that “Arms” may be used in the 
singular.  An Act for the Safeguard and Defence of the Country Against the 
Indians, which was good law in Virginia in 1676, established death as the 
punishment for the offense of trading “shot or arms” with the American 
Indian population.
106
  “The act created an irrebutable presumption of such 
trade for any person living in any Indian town . . . who possessed any arms 
or ammunition other than one gun and ten charges of powder and shot.”
107
  
Given that the right protected in the Second Amendment predates the 
Constitution,
108
 the use of “Arms” as referring to a single gun in this context 
indicates that “Arms” could be understood in its singular form. 
Similarly, the 1792 Militia Act, passed into law by the second 
Congress to provide for the adequate arming of the militia, stated that 
“every citizen . . . shall . . . provide himself with a good musket or 
firelock.”
109
  This early act of Congress, enacted less than a year after the 
adoption of the Second Amendment, seems to indicate that a single musket 
or firearm, in the common usage, was sufficient to qualify as “Arms” for 
service within the militia. 
Finally, in describing “the rights of Englishmen (which every 
American colonist had been promised into perpetuity),”
110
 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries from the 1760s stated that “everyone is at liberty to keep or 
carry a gun.”
111
  These sources indicate that the pluralized term “Arms” 
could be construed as a single weapon.  If that is an accurate 
characterization, then the Chicago Ordinance’s limit of one ready-to-use 
 
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
105 Id. (citations omitted). 
106 HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 56. 
107 Id. 
108 Heller, 554 U.S. at 603. 
109 1 Stat. 271 (1792). 
110 Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the 
Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 517 (2008). 
111 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441. 
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firearm in the home may be sufficient to satisfy the Second Amendment’s 
requirement that firearms be allowed for defense in the home. 
2. Support for a Plural Reading 
According to Heller, the “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment 
are those in common usage.
112
  To understand potential limitations on 
quantity of arms possessed, it will be helpful to survey the arms in common 
usage—i.e., the weapons an ordinary citizen would bring when the militia 
was called to assemble—and evaluate whether there appeared to be any 
limit on the number of arms possessed at the time of the Amendment’s 
ratification.  Since this survey demonstrates that citizens often possessed 
more than one weapon,
113
 it suggests that the right to bear “Arms” in the 
Second Amendment may protect the right of citizens to own and keep 
operable multiple weapons. 
To begin with, members of the Continental Congress were very clear 
that it was the “[r]ight of every English subject to be prepared with 
Weapons for his Defense,” using the plural of “weapon.”
114
  And while the 
Militia Act of 1792 required all individuals to provide only a “musket or 
firelock,”
115
 it required that members of the cavalry provide their own 
“pistols and a sword,” which explicitly indicates two firearms and another 
weapon.
116
  Additional support for this position can also be found in Heller, 
which defines “‘arms’ as ‘[w]eapons of offence.’”
117
  Heller further states 
that “[b]y arms, we understand those instruments of offense.”
118
 
Another source cited in the Heller opinion, Cunningham’s A New and 
Complete Law Dictionary, edited in 1771, defines arms as “any thing that a 
man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast 
 
112 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (“The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that 
were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military 
capacity.”). 
113 See infra notes 114–29. 
114 David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 
4 J.L. & POL. 1, 29 (1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115 1 Stat. 271 (1792). 
116 Hardy, supra note 114, at 27.  While there are colorable arguments that modern 
firearms would invalidate the need to protect the right to own multiple arms, determining 
whether a functional equivalent of the Second Amendment is sufficient to satisfy its 
guarantee is beyond the scope of this Comment, which contemplates the text of the 
Amendment as it was understood upon ratification. 
117 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added) (citing 1 JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 106). 
118 Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added) (quoting 1 JOHN TRUSLER, 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 
(3d ed. 1794)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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at or strike another.”
119
  However, the term defined is “Armour or Arms, 
(Arma).”
120
  The latin “arma” is likewise defined in the dictionary under the 
phrase “Arma Libera,” which referred to the “sword and a lance which were 
usually given to a servant, when he was made free.”
121
  In this sense, 
“Arms” is once again given a plural definition in reference to the arms 
borne by a single individual. 
Other sources discussing the arms in common use—that is, arms that 
would be borne for service in the militia at the time of the founding—also 
indicate that more than one weapon fell under the definition of “bear 
Arms.”  In a measure considering grievances of Boston freeholders in 1768, 
a number of items were considered, including one stating that “every listed 
Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers, who by Law are otherwise 




During the military occupation of Boston in 1775, the British 
confiscated the arms of any colonist attempting to leave the city.
123
  This 
effort resulted in the confiscation of a significant number of pistols, which 
demonstrated the prevalence of pistols around the time of the revolution.
124
  
Further, accounts from that period indicate that Americans found it 
necessary “to carry with us some defensive weapons . . . a pair of 
pistols.”
125
  Similarly, in a newspaper piece entitled An American Citizen, 
Tench Coxe, a prominent Federalist writing in 1787–1788, discussed the 
importance of the right to bear arms, describing “Arms” as “[t]heir swords, 




Finally, a 1744 New Jersey enactment demonstrates that the average 
colonist was expected to own multiple weapons to fulfill his duties as part 
of the militia.
127
  It stated that “[e]very person . . . shall be armed with a 
good musket . . . and a bayonet fixed to it, a cutting sword or cutlace . . . 
 
119 Id. at 581 (majority opinion) (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187). 
120 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187. 
121 Id. 
122 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1 (1989). 
123 HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 59. 
124 Id. 
125
 Id. at 59 n.24 (quoting GEORGE C. NEUMANN, THE HISTORY OF WEAPONS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 150 (1967)).  
126 Id. at 68 (quoting Tench Coxe, An American Citizen, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788, in 
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1778–1780 
(Microform Supp.)).  
127 DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 43–44 
(1986). 
488 OWEN MCGOVERN [Vol. 102 
and shall keep at his Place of Abode . . . what is above mentioned.”
128
  It 
further provided that “[e]ach horseman shall be provided with a good horse 
. . . a Case of Pistols, a cutting sword . . . and shall keep at the Place of his 
Abode, beside the Arms abovementioned, a well fix’d Carbine.”
129
 
3. A Plural Reading Is More Faithful to the Original Understanding 
On the balance of the evidence, it appears that while the technical 
definition could be read in the singular, the arms in common usage at the 
time—particularly the widespread use of pistols
130
—provide enough 
examples of plural usage to indicate that “Arms” was not understood as 
limited to a single firearm.  This conclusion is further supported by the fact 
that individuals were expected to provide more than a single weapon—a 
pair of pistols and a sword for cavalrymen, a musket with a bayonet and a 
sword for infantrymen—when called forth as part of the militia.  As such, it 
is likely that the framers of the Second Amendment understood the term 
“Arms” to refer to the pluralized form of weapons that could be used for 
self-defense or service in the militia. 
4. Application to the Chicago Ordinance 
In light of this understanding, the Chicago Ordinance, which allows 
only one operable firearm in the home per licensed owner, should be found 
unconstitutional.
131
  The term “Arms,” as understood at the time of the 
Second Amendment’s ratification, was not limited to a single firearm, so 
forbidding the possession of more than a single operable firearm likely 
violates the meaning of that term.  While modern firearms are significantly 
more effective and easier to assemble than those in existence at the time of 
ratification, the protections of the Second Amendment extend “to all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding.”
132
  Thus, if the original Amendment 
protected the right to own and have operable multiple firearms, advances in 
technology are irrelevant to a textual understanding of what right is 
protected. 
Although it is true that the Ordinance allows owning more than a 
single firearm, historical research and common sense indicate that arms 
were expected to be kept in working order and ready for battle.  The 
original English right to bear arms was understood to require that 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 44. 
130 HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 59 n.24. 
131 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (2010). 
132 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
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Englishmen were “bound to be ready, at all times” to use their arms in 
defense of themselves and the realm.
133
  Indeed, the very notion of the 
“minutemen” was that they would be ready, with functioning arms and 
ammunition, to defend themselves and their province at a minute’s 
notice.
134
  Further, at the time of the founding, it was well understood that 




The nature of the arms borne at the time does not support an 
understanding that only one could be kept operational at a time.  For 
example, if a cavalryman was called to action with his set of pistols, would 
he be required to keep one unloaded and locked in the case until the other 
had been discharged?  This is a nonsensical interpretation of the right to 
bear arms, given the arms in common usage at the time.  Likewise, there is 
no indication that civilian ownership of pistols would be subject to such a 
provision.  As such, it is unlikely that the Chicago Ordinance banning the 
possession of more than one operational firearm at a time adequately 
protects the scope of the right to bear “Arms.” 
B. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE PHRASE “BEAR ARMS” 
1. Scope of the Right to Bear Arms 
Heller has determined that the right to “keep Arms” protects, at the 
least, the right to “have weapons.”
136
  It further determined that “to bear” 
meant “to carry” at the time of the founding, and that “bearing Arms” 
referred to carrying them for the purpose of confrontation.
137
  A question 
not answered by Heller, however, was the place and manner in which an 
individual was permitted to “bear Arms” for purposes of self-defense and 
confrontation. 
As Heller indicated, certain regulations on the place and manner in 
which bearing arms would be permitted, such as regulations restricting 
concealed carry and the carrying of arms in sensitive places, are not to be 
disturbed by the decision.
138
  The Chicago Ordinance, however, has placed 
severe restrictions on where arms may be carried for purposes of self-
defense.  Section 8-20-020 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides that 
it shall be “unlawful for any person to carry or possess a handgun, except 
 
133 Cramer & Olson, supra note 110, at 515. 
134 See HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 60.  
135 Hardy, supra note 114, at 27, 29. 
136 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. 
137 Id. at 584. 
138 Id. at 626–27.  
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when in the person’s home.”
139
  “Home” is defined as “the inside of a 
person’s dwelling unit which is traditionally used for living purposes, 
including the basement and attic,” but does not include “any garage, . . . any 
space outside the dwelling unit, including any stairs, porches, back, side or 




Reviewing the history of the right to keep and bear arms, it is clear that 
limiting the right’s exercise to the confines of one’s apartment is an 
unconstitutional limitation on that right.  Beginning with the language in 
Heller itself, the Court cites nine state constitutions establishing the right of 
a citizen to “bear arms in defense of himself and the state” or citizens to 
“bear arms in defense of themselves and the state.”
141
  As the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms in defense of both 
an individual and the state, this must imply the ability to carry those arms 
outside of one’s home.  It is difficult to imagine how one could exercise the 
right to bear arms in defense of the state from the confines of one’s living 
room. 
Further, Heller indicates that “to keep Arms” and “to bear Arms” have 
separate meanings.
142
  Applying the canon of statutory construction that 
each element of a statute should be given meaning,
143
 “bearing” cannot be 
limited to carrying inside one’s home.  If so, it would carry the same 
meaning as “keep,” making the phrase redundant.  To “keep Arms” refers to 
the right to “possess arms,”
144
 which would presumably be done within the 
confines of one’s home.  Indeed, there is even evidence suggesting that the 
right to “keep Arms” itself encompassed the right to use arms within the 
home to oppose the entry of trespassers.
145
 
The right to “bear Arms,” on the other hand, must extend to purposes 
outside of the home.  No application of the history of the Second 
Amendment to its exercise can possibly warrant limiting the meaning of 
“bear Arms” to carrying a weapon in one’s home.  In Heller, the Court 
discussed at length the possible motivations for the Amendment, which 
could be anything from hunting to fighting off invasion to overthrowing a 
 
139 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-020(a) (2010). 
140 § 8-20-010. 
141 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–85. 
142 See id. at 582–84. 
143 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (stating that effect should be 
given, when possible, to every word in a statute). 
144 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 583–84 n.7 (majority opinion) (“[K]eep arms in his house to oppose the entry of 
the lessor, . . .” (quoting 3 RICHARD BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 88 
(29th ed. 1845))).  
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tyrannical central government.
146
  None of these uses can be accomplished 
if the government can restrict the exercise of bearing arms to the confines of 
one’s home. 
This understanding is further supported by the history of the right to 
bear arms, as “the intent of the state conventions that requested adoption of 
a bill of rights and of the framers in Congress . . . was that the Second 
Amendment recognize[] the absolute individual right to keep arms in the 
home and to carry them in public.”
147
  Indeed, laws requiring that 
individuals bear arms required that they be borne in public places.
148
  This 
does not, of course, mean that the right to bear arms is unlimited, as the 
Court in Heller acknowledged.
149
  Even a communal understanding of the 
Second Amendment cannot limit the right to the home, as it is impossible to 
bear arms for militia service if the weapon may not be carried outside the 
home. 
Finally, Blackstone’s Commentaries establish that “Americans 
understood the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] 
force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too 
late to prevent an injury.’”
150
  Nothing in this understanding of the 
fundamental rights of citizens implies that this right to self-preservation is 
only available to those who stay home. 
2. Application of Keep and Bear Arms to the Chicago Ordinance 
Section 8-20-020 of the Municipal Code of Chicago makes it unlawful 
to possess or carry a handgun outside of one’s home.
151
  While the Court 
has stated that concealed carry laws are not disturbed by its decision in 
Heller, it found the D.C. statute unconstitutional on the basis of its absolute 
prohibition of the right to bear arms in self-defense within one’s home.
152
  
By limiting the right to bear arms to the confines of one’s home, § 8-20-020 
constitutes an absolute ban on the use of handguns for self-defense outside 
 
146 See id. at 597–98. 
147 HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 87. 
148 See, e.g., PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT 18 (2009) (citing a Georgia 
law requiring men to carry guns to church).  
149 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
. . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings. . . .”). 
150 Id. at 595 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*145 n.42). 
151 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-020(a) (2010) (“It is unlawful for any person to carry or 
possess a handgun, except when in the person’s home.”). 
152 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
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of one’s home.
153
  This understanding of the Second Amendment renders 
the terms “keep” and “bear” identical, in contrast to the Court’s 
interpretation in Heller and the canon of statutory interpretation that all 
words in a statute must be given meaning.  Finally, it conflicts with nearly 
every purpose the Second Amendment was intended to achieve.  In light of 
these considerations, section 8-20-020 should be struck down as 
unconstitutional. 
C. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE WELL-REGULATED MILITIA 
1. Implications of the Prefatory Clause as Interpreted in Heller 
The Prefatory Clause of the Second Amendment, “[a] well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” confirms that the 
right to bear arms cannot be limited to the home.
154
  The meaning of that 
clause, as understood by the Supreme Court in Heller, also indicates that 
several other provisions of the Chicago Ordinance will likely be struck 
down as unconstitutional. 
The natural right of self-defense
155
 applies not only to defense of the 
individual, but also to the defense of society against tyranny.
156
  There was 
little disagreement on this understanding at the time of the founding.
157
  As 
Hamilton put it, “[i]f the representatives of the people betray their 
constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original 
right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of 
government.”
158
  It was universally agreed that the well-regulated militia 
consisted of the entire general populace, which was to be armed and trained 
in the use of arms.  Indeed, that the people be well trained in the use of arms 
was central to the founders’ understanding of the Second Amendment and 
was considered the basic source of their liberty.
159
  As Madison put it, “[i]f 
 
153 Although it is true that the Ordinance allows for the use of firearms for defense in 
one’s place of business, if the firearm is registered to that address, it does not allow use of 
the firearm—even in cases of self-defense—for an individual en route to his business, even 
if he operates a cash-heavy business in a dangerous part of town.  See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 
§ 8-20-100. 
154
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
155 Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *139–
40). 
156 HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 66–67 (“[Thomas] Jefferson stressed the inexorable 
connection between the right to have and use arms and the right to revolution . . . .”). 
157 Id. at 67 (“The Federalists were actually in close agreement with Jefferson on the 
right to arms as a penumbra of the right to revolution.”). 
158 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
159 Id. at 66 (“That the people be continually trained up in the exercise of arms . . . so the 
power may rest fully in the disposition of their supreme assemblies.” (quoting 3 JOHN 
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the people [of Europe] were armed and organized into militia, ‘the throne of 
every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the 
legions which surround it.’”
160
 
However, as the Prefatory Clause of the Amendment suggests, it was 
equally important that the generalized militia be well regulated; that is, well 
trained.
161
  The fear that led to the codification of this right was not just that 
Congress could create either a select militia or standing army that would 
exercise tyrannical control over the people, but that, in doing so, it would 
endeavor to disarm the people through disuse of the generalized militia.
162
  
Pointing to tactics utilized by pro-British strategists, George Mason 
observed that “the best and most effectual way to enslave them . . . [was] by 
totally disusing and neglecting the militia.”
163
  Indeed, if only Congress may 
call up the militia, it has complete control over when and how the people 
can train in the use of arms.  It would be nonsensical to guarantee the right 
to keep and bear arms as a final protection against tyranny, but then grant 
the government complete control over the exercise of that right.
164
  The 
importance of training was best stated by Richard Henry Lee, who argued 
that “to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people 




2. Application of the Prefatory Clause to the Chicago Ordinance 
When evaluating the relevance of the well-regulated militia to modern 
society and its implications for the validity of statutory restrictions on the 
Second Amendment, it is important to remember Heller’s insistence that 
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood 
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or 
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”
166
 
In light of this history and the universal understanding that the 
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properly trained militia, we evaluate several provisions of the Chicago 
Ordinance (as the city initially amended it) to understand the intended scope 
of the regulation.  The provisions, when taken together, prohibited shooting 
galleries,
168
 any sale of guns,
169
 and any discharge of a firearm within the 
city limits, except in self-defense.
170
  This Section will show that, when 
viewed in conjunction with the requirements that a resident must have a 
Chicago firearm permit for each weapon in his possession
171
 and that 
attaining such a permit requires at least one hour of range training,
172
 the 
Chicago Ordinance—as originally amended
173
—constituted an absolute ban 
on the exercise of the right to bear arms within the City of Chicago and 
destroys the ability of the militia to remain lawfully well regulated without 
leaving the city limits. 
First, a statute forbidding the discharge of firearms within the city 
limits infringes upon the ability of a militia to be trained and effective for 
the defense of a free polity.  The framers feared that the militia would be 
disarmed through disuse.
174
  By banning the practice of marksmanship, the 
City of Chicago disarms its local militia in precisely that manner.   
Similarly, a complete ban on the sale of firearms within the city limits 
infringes not only upon the right of the individual to arm himself for his 
personal defense, but also upon the ability of the militia to arm itself.  It is 
true that Heller upheld the constitutionality of “laws imposing conditions 
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
175
  However, what the 
Court clearly detests are regulations that constitute absolute bans upon the 
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This set of regulations also imposes an impermissible obstacle upon 
the ability of an individual to exercise the precise right protected in Heller: 
ownership and use of a firearm in one’s home for self-defense.
177
  A 
resident of Chicago must attain a Chicago firearm permit, which requires at 
least four hours of class instruction and one hour of range training.
178
  
However, the Ordinance prohibits the very actions required to attain the 
certification, since discharging a firearm within the city limits is prohibited 
except in self-defense.  Even if firearms were allowed to be discharged in 
the city, the Ordinance initially banned the establishment of firing ranges, 
which are the only places where certification can be safely accomplished.
179
 
These prohibitions are not constitutionally justifiable on the grounds 
that residents may receive training, buy their firearms, or practice with their 
weapons elsewhere in Illinois.  Just as Chicago could not ban the 
fundamental right to protest within the city limits on the grounds that you 
can protest outside the city,
180
 it cannot ban the exercise of an individual’s 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms within the city limits. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of Heller, the purpose behind the provisions of the 
Second Amendment, and the Chicago Ordinance provide some general 
guidelines as to what will and will not be permitted in regulating the “right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms.”  As was made clear in Heller, 
absolute bans on the exercise of a fundamental right—such as Chicago’s 
absolute ban on bearing arms outside the home or discharging arms in the 
city—will fail constitutional muster under “any of the standards of scrutiny 
that [the Justices] have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”
181
 
The major failing of the Chicago Ordinance is that it interpreted the 
Court’s decision in Heller as limiting the Second Amendment to possession 
of a handgun for self-defense in the home.  In doing so, the city ignored the 
Court’s embrace of significantly more than the particular holding 
articulated and set itself up for a constitutional challenge.  Legislatures 
looking to craft legislation that will withstand scrutiny in the courts must 
respect the three major themes underlying Heller and the implications for 
the scope of the Second Amendment. 
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First, there can be no absolute bans on the exercise of the fundamental 
right of the people to keep and bear arms.  This applies to each provision of 
the Amendment.  As such, the second takeaway is that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to “bear Arms” as well as the right to “keep 
Arms.”  No reading of the Amendment’s ratification history can possibly 
support the City of Chicago’s complete prohibition on carrying guns 
outside of one’s home.  Restricting the right to “bear Arms” to a person’s 
abode not only renders it redundant with the right to “keep Arms,” but also 
conflicts with the need for a well-regulated militia and the ability of the 




Finally, and perhaps less obviously in modern society, it is important 
to recognize the historical justification for the codification of this pre-
existing, fundamental right within the Constitution.  As the Court 
recognized in Heller, the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” was 
necessary not only to preserve the security of the individual within his 
home, but also to secure the freedom of the polity from all foes—including 
the tyranny of a strong, centralized government.
183
  At ratification, “[i]t was 
understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the 
ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive 
military force if the constitutional order broke down.”
184
  When regulators 
lose sight of this purpose, and interpret the right too narrowly—as the City 
of Chicago did in adopting the Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance—
they legislate against the rights enshrined in the Second Amendment.  
Legislators who keep these three principles in mind will be able to craft 
effective, constitutional legislation and avoid the founders’ dire fear that 
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